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If tax obligations are met, the balanced-budget substitution of an ad valorem tax on output for 
a  specific  tax  not  only  raises  a  monopolist's  production,  but  also  represents  a  Pareto 
improvement. However, if tax avoidance or evasion is feasible and the marginal costs of such 
actions decline with the legal tax burden, a monopolist will respond to a balanced-budget 
substitution of an ad valorem tax for a specific tax by reducing output, while profits remain 
constant. Therefore, in the presence of tax avoidance or evasion activities a move towards 
specific taxation can represent a Pareto improvement. 
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1. Introduction 
There  is  a  long-standing  debate  on  the  relative  merits  of  ad  valorem  and  specific  (unit) 
taxation. Based on a setting with constant marginal costs, Wicksell (1896) showed that a 
monopolist's incentives to curtail output are less pronounced in the presence of an ad valorem 
tax than for a specific tax of equal yield. The reason is that the ad valorem tax mitigates the 
fall in the after-tax price resulting  from an output expansion. Suits and Musgrave (1953) 
generalised this finding, assuming a general cost function. Building on this foundation, inter 
alia,  Skeath  and  Trandel  (1994)  established  that  the  ad  valorem  tax  Pareto-dominates  a 
specific tax of equal yield since both profits and consumer surplus rise, a result already hinted 
at in the work by Wicksell (1896). These analyses with simple monopoly settings have been 
extended in various ways, often confirming the superiority of ad valorem taxation.
1 However, 
the superiority of ad valorem taxation may no longer result in general equilibrium settings 
(Grazzini  2006,  Blackorby  and  Murty  2007),  under  Bertrand  competition  with  product 
differentiation (Anderson et al. 2001), in the presence of externalities (Dickie and Trandel 
1996, Pirttilä 2002, Dröge and Schröder 2008), in two-sided markets (Kind et al. 2009), in 
multi-product oligopoly  settings (Hamilton 2009), and even in  competitive markets either 
with  endogenous  quality  choices  or  output  price  uncertainty  (Liu  2003,  Goerke  2011). 
Furthermore, a specific tax is superior to an ad valorem tax in a monopsony (Hamilton 1999). 
While in all of these contributions, tax obligations are presumed to be fulfilled, there are few 
exceptions. Delipalla (2009a) investigates the relationship between the structure of tobacco 
taxation  and  smuggling  in  an  oligopoly  setting  without,  however,  drawing  welfare 
implications. In addition, Delipalla (2009b) considers a Cournot oligopoly in which formal 
and  informal  firms  coexist.  Formal  sector  firms  pay  ad  valorem  and  unit  taxes,  while 
informality  is  characterised  by  the  absence  of  tax  payments  but  additional  unit  costs  of 
production. Delipalla (2009b) shows that the optimal unit tax rate is zero, indicating that 
informality in her set-up does not invalidate the superiority of ad valorem taxation.  
The optimal structure of commodity taxation in the presence of market imperfections and tax 
avoidance  activities  is  of  substantial  policy  relevance  as  indicated  by,  for  example,  the 
pertinent  chapter  in  the  Mirrlees  Review  (cf.  Crawford  et  al.  2008).  This  is  because  the 
consumption of goods for which sizeable specific taxes exist in OECD countries – such as 
alcoholic  beverages,  mineral  oil  products  and  tobacco  (OECD  2008)  –  generates  a 
considerable  portion  of  overall  tax  revenues  while  the  respective  commodities  tend  to  be 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Kay and Keen (1983), Delipalla and Keen (1992, 2006), Cheung (1998), Denicolò and 
Matteuzzi (2000), and Schröder (2004).   2 
supplied by few firms. In addition, tax evasion and, in particular, tax avoidance activities by 
firms cause substantial revenue losses (Slemrod 2004, 2007, Keen and Smith 2006, Gatti and 
Honorati 2008). In a recent study published by the European Commission (2009), the gap 
between the theoretical VAT liability and actual receipts in 2006 was estimated at about 13% 
of VAT revenues in the European Union. Furthermore, the unweighted VAT revenue ratio for 
all OECD member states is about 60%, where this ratio is defined as the amount of actual 
VAT revenues as a fraction of the revenue that would be collected if the standard VAT rate 
was applied to final consumption (OECD 2008). This figure indicates  that about 40% of 
potential tax revenues are not in fact obtained as a result of reduced tax rates and exemptions, 
tax  avoidance  and  evasion  activities.  The  European  Union  data  moreover  indicate  that  a 
substantial part of this shortfall results from attempts to reduce the tax burden either legally or 
illegally. 
There are many ways in which sales taxes can be evaded, such as the underreporting of sales, 
omitting to pay taxes on imported goods and false claims for credits in the case of VAT (see 
Keen and Smith 2006 for a more comprehensive list). In contrast to evasion, "(t)ax avoidance 
… is within the legal framework of the tax law. It consists in exploiting loopholes in the tax 
law  in  order  to  reduce  one’s  tax  liability;  …"  (Sandmo  2005,  p.  645).  In  the  case  of 
consumption taxes, such loopholes are particularly pronounced in a world with multiple tax 
rates and cross-border shopping. First, in the European Union, for example, there are, besides 
the standard rates which range from 15% to 25%, reduced rates in almost all member states 
and, in 5 further countries, even super-reduced rates. Furthermore, in some countries there are 
exemptions from value-added taxation with or without refund of taxes paid for inputs. Since 
different  tax  rates  are  applied  to  essentially  comparable  goods,  tax  administrations  have 
provided detailed lists (cf. European Commission 2011). However, the distinction between 
different goods leaves scope for mis-classifications and avoidance activities.
2 The repeated 
attempts of tax authorities in the European Union to render these categorisations more precise 
indicate the difficulties in closing loopholes. Second, if individuals can purchase goods in 
jurisdictions in which different commodity tax rates are applied, these differentials provide 
incentives for acquiring commodities in low-tax jurisdictions. Such cross-border shopping can 
be facilitated by producers and thereby contribute to a fall in tax revenues in high-tax areas.
3 
                                                 
2  The  2010  reduction  in  the  VAT  rate  for  overnight  stays  in  hotels  in  Germany  from  19%  to  7%,  while 
expenditure for meals continued to be taxed at the standard rate of 19%, constitutes an excellent example. This 
rate  differential  provides  hotels  with  substantial  incentives  to  adjust  the  price  of  meals,  relative  to  that  of 
accommodation, in order to reduce the tax burden. 
3 There is substantial evidence for such cross-border shopping of petrol, alcohol, and tobacco, for example, in the 
United States and the European Union. Leal et al. (2009) survey the literature.    3 
The recent surge in online shopping raises the scope for such tax avoidance activities further 
(see Ballard and Lee 2007 for evidence regarding the United States). Given these substantial 
possibilities for evading or avoiding taxes on output, the question arises as to whether the 
substitution  of  an  ad  valorem  tax  for  a  specific  tax  will  continue to  raise  output  in  non-
competitive markets if tax avoidance or evasion takes place.  
In the basic model of tax evasion or avoidance by firms, output (and input) choices depend on 
tax rates but are independent of avoidance activities.
4  In consequence, tax avoidance  and 
evasion do not alter the merits of an ad valorem relative to a specific tax. However, this basic 
model of firm behaviour, inter alia, implies that irrespective of the output level a constant 
amount of taxes is avoided or evaded, i.e., that a rise in the official tax burden is mirrored by 
an  equal-sized  increase  in  taxes  paid  (cf.  Yaniv  1995).  Therefore,  small  and  otherwise 
identical large firms are predicted to avoid or evade the same amount of tax; a claim not 
substantiated in empirical studies. If the avoidance technology is modified to allow for a more 
plausible  relationship  between  firm  size  and  such  activities,  the  optimal  structure  of 
commodity taxation can be shown to depend on tax avoidance or evasion opportunities.  
In order to simplify the theoretical analysis we, subsequently, do not model the evasion or 
avoidance activities in detail but simply assume that a partial non-payment of taxes is feasible. 
In addition, we take the extent of market power as given and assume a sole supplier of the 
homogeneous commodity. In this set-up we show that if the marginal costs of avoidance or 
evasion  decline  with  the  official  tax  burden,  the  balanced-budget  substitution  of  an  ad 
valorem for a specific tax will reduce the monopolist's output. A higher tax burden may lower 
these marginal costs if a greater official tax base enhances the opportunities to utilise tax 
loopholes or the marginal penalty in the case of evasion declines with the tax base. If this is 
the case, a tax reform which leaves output unaffected in the absence of avoidance or evasion 
activities can be shown to raise the official tax burden. As a consequence, this reform induces 
the monopolist to engage in greater tax avoidance or evasion. To balance the budget, tax rates 
have to be raised and output declines while, irrespective of the avoidance technology, the tax 
reform does not alter profits. Accordingly, in the presence of tax avoidance or evasion the 
welfare-ranking  of  taxes  may  be  reversed  and  a  substitution  of  a  specific  tax  for  an  ad 
valorem tax can constitute a Pareto improvement. 
In  the  remainder  of  the  paper,  Section  2  lays  out  the  model,  Section  3  investigates  the 
envisaged tax reform, and Section 4 provides a brief summary of the analysis.  
                                                 
4 See Yaniv (1995) for a general formulation of this result which goes back, for example, to Marrelli (1984), 
Wang and Conant (1988) and Yaniv (1988).    4 
2. Model 
Abstracting from the details of tax evasion or avoidance opportunities, the analysis focuses on 
a non-price-discriminating monopolist producing a commodity at constant unit costs c, c > 0. 
The  inverse  demand  function  p(x)  is  linear,  where  p  denotes  the  (demand)  price,  which 
declines with the output level x (p'(x) := dp/dx < 0, p''(x) = 0). The government imposes a 
non-negative unit tax at the rate τ, 0 ≤ τ, and a non-negative ad valorem tax at the rate t, 0 ≤ t 
< 1. If the monopolist pays the amount of taxes due, official net profits will be p(x)x - cx - T, 
where T = x(p(x)t + τ) denotes the official tax burden. For later use, note that the partial 
derivatives of T equal Tt = p(x)x, Tτ = x, and Tx = τ + t(p'(x)x + p(x)) = τ + tε(x), for ε(x) := 
p'(x)x  +  p(x).  In  this  setting,  the  balanced-budget  increase  of  an  ad  valorem  tax  and  the 
concomitant fall in the specific tax will raise output if the amount of taxes due is actually paid 
(Delipalla and Keen 1992, Anderson et al. 2001).  
In the present analysis, however, the monopolist is assumed to engage in tax avoidance or 
evasion activities and to choose optimally the voluntary tax payment S, 0 < S ≤ T, and the 
output level x simultaneously. The costs of tax avoidance or evasion are captured by the 
function H(T, S). If costs H are an increasing function only of the amount T - S of taxes 
evaded or avoided, H will be given by H(T - S), for H', H'' > 0. Such a cost function has 
traditionally been assumed.
5 In addition, the specification H(T - S) implies that the marginal 
costs of avoidance or evasion -∂H/∂S = -HS, that is of reducing S, rise with the official tax 
burden  T,  implying  that  HST  =  -HSS  <  0  for H''  >  0.  The  rationale  for  this  assumption 
probably relies on the interpretation of H as representing the expected penalty in an analysis 
of  tax  evasion.  From  this  perspective,  a  higher  tax  burden  T  raises  the  amount  of  taxes 
evaded, T – S, for a given voluntary payment S and, therefore, the penalty. As mentioned in 
the introduction, this functional form of H gives rise to the (somewhat) implausible prediction 
that the amount of taxes evaded or avoided is constant, irrespective of the tax rates or demand 
conditions.  Note,  furthermore,  that  the  cross-derivative  HST  will  also  be  negative  if  the 
expected penalty H consists of the product of a linear penalty function which rises with T – S 
and a detection probability which decreases linearly with the voluntary tax payment S. While 
a  positive  relationship  between  tax  evasion  and  detection  probability  is  often  assumed, 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) also consider the case that the detection probability rises with 
                                                 
5 See, inter alia, Marrelli (1984), Virmani (1989), Cremer and Gahvari (1992, 1993), Besfamille et al. (2009), 
and Bayer and Cowell (2009) for analytical settings in which the difference between T and S is interpreted as tax 
evasion and Cross and Shaw (1982) and Erard (1993), who consider tax avoidance (by individuals).   5 
S, ceteris paribus, arguing that such a relationship could result from the tax authorities' belief 
that rich individuals are more likely to evaded income taxes. 
If H depicts the costs of tax avoidance and not of tax evasion it may, however, well be the 
case that the marginal costs of legally reducing the amount of taxes paid, i.e. of a fall in S, do 
not rise, but shrink with the official tax burden T, as avoidance opportunities become more 
ample. This could be the case because (1) a higher tax base makes avoidance less costly at the 
margin, (2) the number of tax loopholes and of avoidance strategies that can be utilised rises 
with the amount of taxes due, or because (3) administrative costs of complying with the tax 
system and, therefore, also of legally reducing tax payments decline with a firm's tax base.
6 In 
this case, HST > 0 is a more appropriate assumption.
7  
In sum, the features of the cost of avoidance or evasion function captured by HTT = HSS =  
-HST, and underlying the specification H(T - S), represent a special case. As a consequence, 
we presume a (more) general cost function H(T, S), satisfying 0 < HT, HTT, HSS > 0 > HS. 
However, following Roine (2006) and Traxler (2009), for example, we do not impose a sign 
on HST.
8 Finally, we assume that HTt < 1 so that a rise in the official tax burden T does not 
reduce profits by more than 1/t. In a setting in which H(T – S) holds, that is, in a standard tax 
evasion  setting,  HT  <  1  ensures  that  evasion  actually  takes  place  at  all.  To  simplify  the 
exposition, we will subsequently refer to the H(T, S) as cost of tax avoidance, although the 
previous discussion has made clear that it can also capture the cost of tax evasion. 
Given the above assumptions, we can express the net profits π of a tax-avoiding monopolist 
as: 
) S ), t , ), t , ( x ( T ( H S cx x ) x ( p ) S , x ( τ τ − − − = π       (1) 
                                                 
6 There is substantial evidence that administrative costs of taxation represent a smaller fraction of the tax base for 
larger firms than for smaller ones, as the comprehensive survey by Vaillancourt et al. (2008) demonstrates. 
7  See  Slemrod  (2001)  and  Grubert  and  Slemrod  (1998)  for  similar  settings  within  models  of  personal  or 
corporate income tax avoidance. Slemrod (2001), for example, assumes that the cost function H depends on the 
tax base and the amount of income avoided. If the tax base and the official tax burden are related positively, his 
assumption implies that H = H(T, T – S) holds. He furthermore considers -HTS = ∂2H/(∂T∂(T – S)) ≤ 0 to be 
"the most likely case", although the sign of the cross-derivative "is ultimately an empirical question" (Slemrod 
2001, p. 121). The respective evidence on tax compliance and firm size is scarce and mixed and can only be 
indicative of the sign of HTS because, for example, firm size is a very rough measure of tax liability T. Rice 
(1992), for example, reports a positive effect of a firm size variable on non-compliance, while Hanlon et al. 
(2007) find a U-shaped relationship. Giles (2000), Gatti and Honorati (2008), Cai and Liu (2009), Dabla-Norris 
et al. (2008), and Tedds (2010) observe larger firms to be more compliant. 
8 An example of a function H satisfying all the above requirements is H = (T - S)α + β/(ST), where α ≥ 1 and β ≥ 
0 hold. For α = 1 and β > 0, we have HST > 0 and in the case of α > 1 and β = 0, HST < 0 results. In both 
settings HT > 0 can be guaranteed by appropriate choice of the parameters α and β.    6 
Maximisation with respect to output x and actual tax payments S yields: 
0 T H c ) t T H 1 )( x ( )) x ( t ( T H c ) x ( x T T H c )) x ( p x ) x ( ' p ( x = τ − − − ε = ε + τ − − ε = − − + = π   (2a) 
0 S H 1 S = − − = π               (2b) 
The last equality in the first-order condition (2a) indicates that ε(x) > 0 and, hence, ε(x) > c > 
0 hold, since HTt < 1. It therefore implies that a rise in output will always increase revenues 
net of ad valorem tax payments or, alternatively, that the monopolist will never expand output 
to such an extent that marginal revenues fall below unit costs. Note, finally, for later use that 
ε(x) > c implies that Tx > 0 and vice versa. The derivatives of equations (2a) and (2b) are: 
0 2 ) x T ( TT H ) t T H 1 )( x ( ' p 2 xx < − − = π         (3a) 
0 SS H SS < − = π               (3b) 
x T ST H xS Sx − = π = π             (3c) 
The sufficient second-order condition D > 0 for a maximum of (1) will hold if HTTHSS – 
(HST)2 > 0, which we assume to be the case.  
SS H ) t T H 1 )( x ( ' p 2 ] 2 ) ST H ( SS H TT H [ 2 ) x T ( D − − − =      (4) 
Since the term in square brackets in (4) will be zero for H = H(T – S), a necessary condition 
for the output choice to maximise profits is the restriction HTt < 1 imposed above. 
3. Output Effects of Commodity Tax Reform 
Assume that the government lowers the specific tax τ and raises the ad valorem tax rate t, 
holding  constant  the  monopolist's  actual  tax  payments  S  and,  hence,  public  revenues.  To 
analyse the output effects of this tax reform, we need to know the impact of a marginal rise in 
the tax rates on the first-order conditions in (2): 
0 x x T TT H T H x < − − = τ π             (5a) 
0 x ) x ( p x T TT H ) x ( T H xt < − ε − = π          (5b) 
) x ( p
St x ST H S
π
= − = τ π             (5c) 
Using equations (3), (4), and (5), we can calculate the changes in output x as:   7 
0
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0
D
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− =      (6b) 
The decrease in the specific tax rate τ which becomes feasible due to a marginal rise in the ad 
valorem tax rate t is determined by dS = Sτdτ + Stdt = 0, where St and Sτ are given by: 
[ ] x T T H ) t T H 1 ( x ) x ( ' p 2
D
ST H
S + − = τ ) x ( p
x ) x ( ' p
x T T H
D
ST H
) x ( p
t S
− =     (7a) 
[ ] ) x ( x T T H ) t T H 1 )( x ( xp ) x ( ' p 2
D
ST H
t S ε + − =         (7b) 
A priori, the budgetary effect of a rise in either of the tax rates is uncertain. In the present 
framework  this  ambiguity  is  particularly  pronounced,  because  there  is  no  tax-base  effect 
resulting from a rate change, in contrast to a setting in which taxes due are always paid. 
Instead, the firm adjusts its actual tax payments S in accordance with the first-order conditions 
(2a) and (2b). Let us suppose then, hypothetically, that actual payments S declined with tax 
rates. In this case, the optimal policy would be to lower tax rates and thereby expand actual 
revenues S and output x (cf. equation (5)), thus achieving a Pareto improvement. Once a 
situation had been reached in which additional reductions in tax rates would not raise tax 
revenues any further, the issue of the optimal structure of commodity taxation would become 
relevant, that is, the problem we focus on here. In consequence, we assume that St, Sτ > 0. 
Substituting for HT in accordance with (2a), which is feasible for Tx > 0, we can rewrite 
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t S       (8b) 
Since ε(x) - c > 0, the second and third terms in square brackets in equations (8a) and (8b) are 
positive, whereas the respective first terms are negative. Therefore, the sign restrictions on St 
and Sτ do not generate insights with respect to the derivative HST. The output effect of the 
balanced-budget tax reform (see Appendix for a derivation) is:   8 
4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 1
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         (9) 
Accordingly, for HST < 0 (> 0), output will rise (fall) with a balanced-budget substitution of 
an ad valorem tax for a specific tax. Employing Tt = p(x)x, Tτ = x, and ε(x) = p(x) + p'(x)x, as 
well as equations (8) and (9), we can show that the proposed tax reform neither has an impact 
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      (11) 
Net profits π remain constant because output x and tax payments S are chosen optimally, 
while the official tax burden T and, hence, the costs of avoidance are unaffected, for a given 
payment S.
9 The change in the official tax burden T consists of a direct effect in square 
brackets in equation (10) resulting from the variations in the tax rates, which is positive for 
HST > 0 (since p(x) > ε(x) > c) and will be negative if HST < 0. In consequence, the firm 
adjusts  output x,  inducing  a  change  in  T  as  the  last  term  in  equation (10)  clarifies.  This 
adjustment owing to the output change exactly compensates the direct tax effect, irrespective 
of the tax avoidance technology, that is, of the sign of HST. This is the case because the 
incentives to avoid tax payments, as given by equation (2b), must be unaffected by the tax 
reform. This restriction, dictated by the requirement of constant tax revenues S, necessitates 
an unchanged difference between the official tax burden T and the amount of taxes paid S.
10 
We summarise the findings captured by equations (9) to (11) in 
                                                 
9 This prediction differs from the result for a setting without tax avoidance, namely that profits will rise with the 
balanced-budget introduction of an ad valorem tax (Skeath and Trandel 1994).  
10 Any variation in determinants of the firm's output decision which alters the official tax burden will cause an 
adjustment in the amount of tax avoidance, given HSS, HST > 0. This is in contrast to an avoidance technology 
H(T - S) for which the first-order condition (2b) dictates a constant value of T - S, irrespective of the output 
level. Note that for the general function H(T, S), T - S is constant in the case of the balanced-budget tax reform 
only because S cannot be varied by assumption.   9 
Proposition 1 
Given a tax-avoiding or tax-evading monopolist, the balanced-budget substitution of an 
ad valorem tax on output for a specific tax alters neither the official tax burden T nor net 
profits π. The tax reform will reduce output x if the marginal gain HS from a higher tax 
payment rises with the official tax burden T, implying that HST > 0. For HST < 0, the 
reverse prediction holds. 
The intuition for this finding can best be obtained by starting with the standard case of there 
being no tax avoidance or evasion. If the ad valorem tax rate is raised while the specific tax 
rate is reduced in a manner which ensures that tax payments remain unaffected at the initial 
output level, the monopolist will have an incentive to expand its output. This effect occurs 
because the increase in the ad valorem tax diminishes marginal revenues by less than they are 
raised due to the fall in the specific tax. Given higher marginal revenues and unchanged unit 
costs, the monopolist produces a greater quantity. This quantity expansion generates a budget 
surplus so that tax rates can be reduced, strengthening the positive output effect.  
Suppose next that, say, tax evasion is feasible and its costs are given by H(T - S), where H', 
H'' > 0 hold. This implies that HST < 0 and, in addition, that the output decision can be 
separated from the tax evasion decision. The output level is independent of evasion activities 
(as can be seen from inspection of equation (2a) for HT = - HS = 1). In this case, the tax 
reform that leaves tax payments T constant in the absence of evasion raises the monopolist's 
output (Suits and Musgrave 1953, Skeath and Trandel 1994). However, this change has no 
impact on the gain from tax evasion which is determined by the constant difference between 
the official tax burden T and the amount S of taxes paid. Accordingly, the tax reform does not 
alter actual tax revenues and, therefore, the positive output effect of the shift towards ad 
valorem taxation is unaffected (cf. equation (9)). 
Assume,  finally,  that  the  monopolist's  output  decision  cannot  be  separated  from  the  tax 
underpayments (HT ≠ - HS), to which we refer as avoidance, for simplicity. If, furthermore, 0 
> HST > -HSS applies, the increase in profits resulting from the tax reform in the absence of 
tax avoidance activities is mitigated. The costs of avoiding an additional unit of tax payments 
decline, relative to those occurring in the case of a cost function H(T - S). As a consequence, 
the monopolist increases the amount of taxes avoided, given the tax rate variations occurring 
in the absence of avoidance activities. As long as this effect on avoidance is not too strong, 
i.e.  HST  <  0  holds,  the  marginal  revenue  impact  will  dominate  the tax  avoidance  effect.   10 
However, for HST > 0, the marginal costs of avoidance fall with a higher official tax burden. 
To  maximise  net  profits,  the  monopolist  will  substitute  avoidance  for  output  and,  hence, 
reduce the latter.  
In  conclusion,  tax  avoidance  or  evasion  activities  may  strengthen  the  positive  impact  on 
output resulting from a marginal substitution of an ad valorem tax for a specific tax (if HST < 
-HSS < 0), may mitigate it (if 0 > HST > -HSS), or may even reverse it (for HST > 0). 
However, this effect of tax avoidance or evasion is conditional on the tax reform already 
having an output effect in the absence of a difference between T and S. Such an output effect 
does not arise in a deterministic competitive setting (Suits and Musgrave 1953, Keen 1998) 
which could be modelled by setting p'(x) = 0 in the first-order condition (2a). Inspection of 
equation (9) then shows that avoidance activities do not alter the finding that the commodity 
tax structure is irrelevant in a competitive market. 
Corollary 1  
The balanced-budget substitution of an ad valorem tax for a specific tax will not alter 
output in a competitive market, irrespective of the amount of tax avoidance or evasion 
activities.  
The intuition for Corollary 1 is basically the same as for a world without tax avoidance or 
evasion: a change in the structure of the commodity tax, holding constant the required tax 
payment, does not affect a competitive firm's incentives to alter output. Given an unchanged 
output level and a constant tax burden, also the amount of taxes actually paid remains optimal.  
4. Summary 
If the costs of not paying the full amount of taxes are a function only of the amount of taxes 
avoided or evaded, a firm's output decision can be separated from its avoidance choice. In 
such  a  setting,  a  monopolist's  response  to  the  balanced-budget  shift  from  specific  to  ad 
valorem taxation is unaffected by avoidance or evasion activities. However, if the amount of 
taxes not paid has an effect on output, tax avoidance or evasion opportunities may strengthen, 
mitigate  or  reverse  the  output  and  welfare  consequences  of  the  proposed  tax  reform.  In 
particular, if the marginal costs of tax avoidance fall with the official tax base, for example, it 
becomes easier to find tax loopholes the larger the official tax base is because, the balanced-
budget  shift  towards  ad  valorem  taxation  will  reduce  the  monopolist's  output.  Profits, 
however, are unaffected by the tax reform, given an adjustment in tax payments. In such a 
situation,  a  shift  away  from  ad  valorem  taxation  represents  a  Pareto  improvement.   11 
Furthermore, the interaction between the tax reform and avoidance activities requires the shift 
towards specific taxation to already have an effect on output in the absence of tax avoidance 
activities and, consequently, does not occur in a competitive setting. Since, however, the tax 
reform's impact on output also arises in an oligopoly without tax avoidance or evasion (Keen 
1998), it is likely to occur in an oligopolistic world with avoidance or evasion activities as 
well.   12 
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Appendix - Derivation of Equation (9) 






























       (A.1) 
Substituting p(x)dx/dτ – p'(x)xHTHSS/D for dx/dt in accordance with the equations in (6) and 
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  (A.2) 
Simplifying and relacing St and dx/dτ in accordance with equations (6a) and (7b), yields: 
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Using ε(x) = p(x) + p'(x)x, it can be noted that all terms that include HTHSSTx cancel out in 
(A.3). Employing the definition of D (cf. equation (4)) and substituting (ε(x) – c)/Tx for Ht, 
we arrive at: 
x T DS
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